NATIONAL INCORPORATION LAWS FOR TRUSTS by unknown
YALE
LAW JOURNAL
VoL. XI APRIL, 1902 No. 6
NATIONAL INCORPORATION LAWS FOR TRUSTS.*
Premise.-Permit me to premise, perhaps outline, in three propo-
sitions the topic assigned me. In the first place, Alexander Hamilton
in 1796 said:
"We are laboring hard to establish in this country principles
more and more NATIONAL, and free from all foreign ingredients, so
that we may be neither 'Greeks nor Trojans,' but truly Americans."
In this utterance he established a precedent for the intelligent
thought of to-day in regard to the advancement of corporate legis-
lation.
The trend of affairs is to the establishment of principles more and
more national, and free from sectional ingredients, so that we may
be neither Bostonians nor New Yorkers, but truly Americans with
-respect to corporate measures.
The second suggestion is that interstate warfare unfavorably
affecting trade and commerce has in times past more than frequently
resulted in federal assumption of jurisdiction over the matters in dis-
pute as involving the public welfare.
To this, as a third proposition, it may be added that whenever
in the history of this nation any force truly national, affecting or re-
lating to the welfare of the country, has been found to have out-
grown the swaddling clothes of the express powers of the Constitu-
tion, and, as a national force, on the one hand to be entitled to the
protection of national law, and on the other hand properly subject
to the uniformity and control of a federal law, the American people
*Address of James B. Dill, Esq., before the Seminary in Economics of
Harvard University, March ioth, x9o2.
YALE LA WJOURNAL.
have always overridden mere technicalities and have availed them-.
selves of the implied power of the Constitution.
INTRODUCTION.
National Corporations.-I view with favor the enactment of a
National Incorporation Act as distinguished from a national control
of state-created corporations.
The country demands uniform corporate legislation, formulated
upon the good of the country as a whole, and not sectional legisla-
tion, state against state.
Such national law might be along the lines of the National Bank-
ing Act, not abridging the powers of the state to create local cor-
porations, permissive, not mandatory, for the organization of corpo-
rations, national in extent, the business of which relates to trade
with foreign countries or between states.
Affording the protection of the national government against con-
flicting state legislation and local political enactments, afid-what
is equally important--enforcing well-considered regulations and
wholesome restrictions incidental to national institutions, analogous
to the provisions of the national banking system.
Whether or not the national government should by legislation
eventually discourage the organization of state companies other than
local, as in the case of state banks, is perhaps a matter for future
consideration.
A national corporation act should be based upon the public
demand for cleaner legislation and for purer politics premised upon
the assumption that it is more feasible to obtain from the national
body proper regulation and control than in and from various state
legislatures, some of which are to-day engaged in a competitive
warfare for revenue from corporations.
It is only necessary to suggest that proper control and proper
restrictions, provisions for publicity and similar requirements, would
be more readily maintained under a federal act, less subject to evasive
acts, because a national bill would attract the attention of the nation
and could not be passed with the secrecy and despatch of a state act.
These views invite a brief survey of the practical situation of
to-day. TRUSTS ARE A FORCE NATIONAL.
Definition of Trusts.-While the word "trust" has not become
generic to the extent that it is defined by all alike, nevertheless, for
the purposes of this discussion, one may be satisfied to accept that
term as meaning a corporate aggregation engaged in business other
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than merely local, and not confined in its operations and scope to the
state of its creation.
It is proper to include commercial combinations, financial aggre-
gations and every organization, corporate or otherwise, which tend
to concentration and consolidation of force.
The Trust Is a Force.-With this definition I pass to the proposi-
tion that the trust, so-called, has advanced beyond the province of
mere academic discussion.
The question of its origin and its growth has become and must
be regarded as a matter for the historian rather than an essential
element of 'this discussion.
Whatever be the promoting or direct cause of combinations,
industrial or financial, they have become, and to-day are, an integral
element in the struggle of this nation for commercial supremacy.
Nor is this tendency to combination, to concentration, to the
aggregation of power as yet at its height. Its progress will accord-
ing to all indications be as great in the future as it has been during
the last decade.
The advantages and at the same time the dangers of these gigantic
combinations have up to the present time been outlined rather than
actually demonstrated.
Discussion has been thus far based more upon conjecture than
upon actual experience.
Not only Americans, but foreigners also have begun to realize
and to recognize the national force and the international power of
this movement.
Viewing the subject on the one hand from the standpoint of
undoubted advantage to the country, some are inclined to advocate
the free passage of combinations throughout the United States and
the doing away with legal limitations upon their progress and
growth.
They urge the liberalization of our corporation laws, without
regard to proper control and wholesome restrictions.
Having in mind, on the other hand, the potential dangers involved
in the possession of power of any kind, others are inclined to advo-
cate devoting the entirety of the legislative energy to the repression
and suppression of the trust movement; their conviction being that
the centralization and enlargement of power accompanying the for-
mation of vast combinations must, unless brought under rigid restric-
tion. present more than merely a menace to the well-being of the
country.
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The safe principle, however, is found in the statement that the
"Trust Problem" is not the problem of abolishing industrial combi-
nations, but of properly applying the principles which they represent,
recognizing that they are a power national in extent and a necessary
subject of federal jurisdiction.
The basis of discussion as to the legal control of combinations
must be, not primarily utility, and secondarily control, but utilization
and control standing pari passu.
A realization both of the utility and of the dangers is essential
to an intelligent appreciation of the "Trust Problem."
Trusts are a National Force.-The trusts of to-day are a force and
a power national in extent.
National in extent in that their business extends not only through-
out all of the original and acquired territory of this country, but is
rapidly overleaping the boundaries of our states and possessions,
entering into foreign countries and making rapid inroads into foreign
markets; and national in extent also in that their financial roots
extend down and into every Commonwealth and municipality of this
country.
Investing stockholders of the so-called trusts and combinations
are innumerable and widely scattered.
The list of stockholders of a single corporation contains over
five thousand investors scattered throughout the United States.
One gives special emphasis to the term "investing stockholders"
as showing the hold which these organizations have taken upon the
people of this country; a safe-guarding, it is true, both for the coun-
try and for the corporation, but as well a menace to the extent that
an industrial panic would not be confined to the bankers and finan-
ciers of Wall Street,,but would be felt also in many villages, towns
and cities throughout the United States. And the destruction of
the widow's mite represents more of personal suffering than the loss
of a portion of a millionaire's riches.
It has been said, and with some accuracy, that the death of a
financier, controlling the policies of great industrial combinations,
a man of the type of J. Pierpont Morgan, would more affect the
industrial, financial and commercial interests of the United States
than would the death of a President of the United States.
Be this as it may, it needs no demonstration to support the propo-
sition that the trusts of to-day are a force national in extent, that they
are a fundamental part of the commercial and financial growth of
this country. Correlated with this proposition is the equally demon-
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strable statement that, to the extent that power and force present
advantages to this country, to the same extent must that power and
force uncontrolled tend to become a menace.
Trusts are a national force and have outgrown the confines of
mere state legislation.
LEGAL CHARACTER OF TRUSTS.
Trusts are State-Created Corporations.-Not only are they the
creation of legislation, of limited geographical jurisdiction, but in
many respects the courts of the state that created them have jurisdic-
tion of their internal affairs to the exclusion of the courts of the states
into which they may go; the general rule being that, where the act
complained of affects the complainant solely in his capacity as a
member of the corporation, whether it be as stockholder, as director,
president or other officer, and is the act of the corporation, whether
acting in stockholders' meeting or through its agents, the board of
directors, such action is the management of the internal affairs of the
corporation, and the courts of the state which created the corporation
have jurisdiction to the exclusion of the courts of other states.
It has been further held that it is immaterial that the visible,
tangible property of the foreign corporation is situated in the state;
that, nevertheless, all questions as to the organization of the foreign
corporation, its corporate functions, who shall become its members,
and what are their rights as members are matters relegated to the
courts of the state which created the organization.
We thus have the rights of a Boston stockholder in a South
Dakota organization determined by the judge of the South Dakota
courts interpreting the statutes of South Dakota.
We have the members of the great financial combinations prac-
tically located in New York, with their millions of capital, relegated
to the courts of New Jersey for a determination of their rights as
stockholders.
Ve have the foreclosure of the properties of great trusts, prop-
erties, real and personal, in various states, ordered, decreed, modified
and stayed by courts in New Jersey.
We have the United States Supreme Court referring such mat-
ters back to the states.
REGULATION AND CONTROL.
Public Opinion.-Apart from the personal character of the offi-
cers in control, the great controlling influence upon the combinations
is public opinion.
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Public opinion is of two kinds: Unformulated, viz., that which
is created by discussion, by literature and chiefly by the Press and
formulated public opinion-the statutes. The latter, one would nat-
urally assume, because of their enacting power, would be the highest
form of public opinion; but to-day, under our system of state legisla-
tion, that proposition is reversed. The highest order of public opinion
is the unformulated, or that public opinion which has not yet been
enacted into statutes with the resulting limitations of state statutes.
UNFORMULATED PUBLIC OPINION is NOT CONFINED LOCALLY.
IT IS NATIONAL.
Public Opinion (Unformulated).-It is the offspring of the best
thought and integrity throughout the nation. National public opin-
ion is the principle upon which the United States of America has
stood for success and has won out in the fight.
If the best thought, if the majority of the best minds, if the integ-
rity of intellect of this country can convince the people of the United
States as a whole that certain lines of control are for the good of the
people as a nation, then a national legislative body should create fed-
eral statutes certainly as wide as the interests involved, and most
assuredly as broad as the public opinion which demands the law.
Such, however, is to-day not the case.
STATE LEGISLATION.
Limitations on Formulated Public Opinion.-The subject is
national in extent, the interests are national, the best public opinion
is national, but legislation is state and sectional.
All laws are supposed to be but the formation of an intelligent
public opinion based upon an understanding of the situation and a
just appreciation of the interest of the parties involved.
LIMITATIONS OF STATE LEGISLATION.
As to corporation law public opinion to-day, when it reaches what
ought to be its highest stage of efficiency as a force, becomes, under
our present system of state statutes and state corporate legislation,
circumscribed and limited in its efficiency.
I. Always circumscribed geographically, by the limits of the state
creating the statute.
2. Generally dwarfed in its birth by the subordination of the gen-
eral principle involved to the local and ofttimes political state issues.
3. Frequently limited in its application by the elimination of the
question of the good of the nation and by the substitution for the wel-
fare of the country of the interest, frequently political, quite generally
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financial, of the state in question, even to the prejudice of other
states.
4. Sometimes formulated as a part of a political system which
looks to the good of the party, rather than to the best interests even
of the state.
There is to-day no forum in which a public national opinion in
regard to the great national question of trusts, their advantages or
disadvantages, their uses and abuses, can be heard and the judgment
of the nation formulated into a nationally created and nationally
enacted public law.
All of these great and vitally important national questions are
relegated to the geographical limitation, to the financial rivalry
and the political systems of the states, with a result that South
Dakota, West Virginia and Maine on their respective lines of policy
formulate a public opinion in the shape of a statute which in its re-
sulting effect, passes over and into the State of Massachusetts, re-
lating to and affecting the property of the citizens of Massachusetts.
The citizen of Massachusetts who is a stockholder in a South
Dakota, West Virginia, Maine or Delaware, corporation is relegated
to the formulated public opinion of that state for the determination
of his rights, according to the statutes and laws of that state, perhaps
in disregard of public opinion, formulated or unformulated, in which
he may concur, and which prevails in his own state.
We can look for no effective publicity-no effective restrictions
or regulation of corporate power under a system of diverse state
legislation.
Laxity of legislation as a rule fixes the standard upon the prin-
ciple that "the team is no faster than the slowest horse."
Public opinion formulated into statutes, to be of the highest effi-
ciency and to be freed from evils of subordination, must be uniform
among all the states and national in extent.
UNIFORMITY OF STATE LEGISLATION IMPOSSIBLE.
A study of the inception, the history and the growth of the cor-
porate legislation of the respective states impresses one with the
fact thatthe tendency of states in the matter of corporate legislation
is to segregation rather than to unity, to diversity rather than to uni-
formity.
State Systems, etc., Differ.-Many states whose corporate sys-
tem of legislation is of a high order have not only approached this
system at the inception of their laws from different view-points, but
have, upon that view-point, built up a legislative scheme, and also
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have a thoroughly adjudicated system of case law upon this subject.
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and New Jersey are examples.
Massachusetts strongly, Pennsylvania, perhaps, less urgently,
insist upon public publicity for all corporations, public, quasi public-
or private. New Jersey, on the other hand, insists on and has con-
sistently adhered to the principle of private publicity as being the
better doctrine for business companies.
As to the issuance of stock, they differ in theory, Massachusetts
more nearly taking the position of insisting upon an official state
valuation for stock, while New Jersey, not permitting stock to be
issued for services (the great vehicle for the transmission of water,
so-called, into corporate organizations), permits the issue of stock
for property or money, but compels publicity to the extent of requir-
ing the corporation in the certificate of payment of capital stock,
and thereafter in each annual report, to distinguish between that
stock which is issued for cash and that which is issued for property.
By means of private publicity, every stockholder can ascertain for
himself for what property the stock is issued.
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania take the stand that stock must
be issued for money or money's worth, and that the state and the
courts are the judges both as to the law and the fact of what is the
value of the property for which stock is issued.
New Jersey takes the position that this is too dangerous for the
stockholders because of the tendencies of juries and courts after a
failure, looking backward, to minimize values of property; and there-
fore she makes as the standard the judgment of the Board of Direct-
ors as determined and declared at the time of the issue, provided that
judgment is free from fraud.
New Jersey.-Honest and thorough students of economics differ
as to the true standard, but New Jersey's principle is more in accord
with the English doctrine in this respect.
The position of the speaker in regard to New Jersey's corpo-
ration laws is too well known to need explanation, even if it were of
interest. It is, however, not inappropriate to say that I view with
favor the legislative theory of private publicity and of honest valu-
ations by directors not subsequently reviewable as to values by juries
as issues of fact execpt in case of fraud, provided those valuations
be always ascertainable, so that the public may know precisely for
what the stock stands.
New Jersey's system of corporate legislation is often asserted to-
be loose and lax, but the assertion is sometimes made by those who.
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have not made a thorough study of the laws and decisions of that
state.
The assumption that it is due solely to the so-called liberal fea-
tures of New Jersey's law that she has attracted capital to her bor-
ders is a mistake. On the contrary, it is my belief that the perma-
nency of her corporation policy, the provisions of the constitution
protecting the corporate dollar from any other or further tax than
the individual dollar and prohibiting special legislation and special
charters, the business-like administration of her executive offices-as
instanced by the fact that one Secretary of State remained as head of
that important department for twenty-seven years-the intelligence,
integrity and high character of both Bench and Bar, that these ele-
ments have given the public confidence in the stability and in the ad-
ministration of her laws and have brought capital, business, trade
and commerce within her borders, with the legitimate return by way
of tax income. The success of New Jersey has led other states into
the erroneous conclusion that the liberal features, so-called, of her
laws have brought capital to New Jersey, and this has induced them
to adopt the utility provisions of New Jersey's laws without the ele-
ments of control and regulation, which latter are an essential and
permanent part of her system.
Whatever, however, may be the verdict of public opinion uporr
this point, the first suggestion which I have to make is that the better
class of states are built up upon different systems, and that an at-
tempt to make them uniform would necessitate a reversal of the
legislative and judicial history of the state with regard to corpora-
tions-an outcome which state pride, if nothing more, tends to pre-
vent.
The Policy of other States.-Rivalry for business creates the leg-
islative policy of protection for domestic corporations, of antagonism
and warfare against foreign corporations.
Some of the so-called charter-granting states have chatters for
sale.
They are looking, not only for the initial fee for the organization
of the corporation, but also for the yearly return in taxes.
The trend of State legislation is sometimes to enact laws with a
view to procuring pecuniary returns to the State rather than ad-
hering to sound principles.
Corporate measures are apt to be weighed by some legislatures:
First, upon monetary scales;
Second, upon political scales;
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Finally, if found satisfactory by these tests, then by the standard
of propriety and integrity.
States seek to import into their own scheme of legislation pro-
visions of the corporation laws of other states which seem to have
proved attractive to corporations and to have brought business and
revenue into the state.
The authors of New York's so-called "liberalizing act" laud this
and that provision as being from New Jersey's law, without much
attention being paid to the question whether or not the provision
thus imported and thrust into New York's corporate scheme har-
monizes with the rest of New York's law, or whether or not it car-
ries with it the accompanying restrictions of New Jersey's law.
The controlling question seems to be one of immediate financial
returns, of financial expediency and resulting political desirability.
In the reported hearings by a New York Legislative Committee
upon Senator Krum's bill to tax foreign corporations, the issue
seemed to be whether New York could take over New Jersey's in-
come from corporations; could keep its corporations at home and
bring others into the state.
Speaking of the proposed Krum bill to tax foreign corporations,
a New York corporation lawyer is reported to have said before the
Senate Committee:
"I want to say to you that if you fix it so corporations can't
luxuriate here, they will find other fields in which they may
flourish."
Chairman Krum: "Didn't we liberalize the incorporation
laws at the last session ?"
Mr. White: "Yes, and I helped you to do it."
Chairman Krum: "So you did. And now it looks very much
as if we had bought a gold brick. The promises that you held
out to us have not been fulfilled."-(New York Times, January
22, 1902.)
The New York illustration is used only because it is near home.
Few states are so free from fault in this respect that they can afford
to cast the first stone.
LEGISLATION FOR REVENUE.
Special legislation for the benefit of any particular corporation,
because of the revenue the corporation brings or is expected to bring
to the state, is open to the charge of being legislation for a price,
especially if the character of such legislation be manifestly unsound
in principle.
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The support of the legislature as a body given to the passage of
an act in consideration of a moneyed return actual oi" prospectiv6,
to the state, provided the act is otherwise unjustifiable, leads'to the
charge of being state legislation for a price, and to the further charge
that this class of legislation tends to corruption on the ground that
an example is set by the state, which is sometimes followed by the
individual legislator in individually legislating for a price.
It is needless to add that this statement is not always well found-
ed; but the fact that such legislation is open to suspicion and gives
rise to such charges is a good reason for its avoidance if not its con-
demnation.
The granting of special charters to individual corporations, with
special or unusual privileges and immunities, tends to create public
distrust, not 'only respecting the integrity of the legislation, but also
as to the freedom from bias of the individual legislator.
As I have before said, one of the commendable features of New
Jersey's corporate legislation scheme is that the constitution of that
state prohibits such special legislation with respect to corporations,
and compels all corporations of a given class to incorporate under
the same act, with the same rights and privileges and subject to the
same restrictions and control.
However, in the discussion of the tendencies of this certainly ob-
jectionable class of legislation, a distinction must be observed re-
garding state legislation, not special, but for legitimate tax revenue.
The fostering of legitimate capital and the inducing of incorpo-
rated capital to locate within the borders of the state are not only
legitimate but commendable in every way.
The securing of proper returns to the state by way of taxes is
eminently proper, and economically commendable.
STATE WARFARE.
The Tendency is to State Warfare.-In corporation matters in
many instances the tendency is to interstate warfare, each state as-
suming a belligerent attitude towards foreign corporations and en-
deavoring to protect its own corporations.
We find some charter-granting states legislating for the follow-
ing classes of corporations :
(i) Corporations organized primarily for the purpose of doing
business outside of the state;
(2) Corporations organized for the purpose of doing without
the state business which is forbidden to be done within the state
which created them;
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(3) Those formed for the purpose of doing their business as
an entirety outside of the state, being specifically forbidden by their
charters from operating or carrying on such business in the state
which created them;
(4) For the express purpose of doing business in evasion, some-
times in violation, of the law of a state into which they propose to
go and to operate.
On the other hand, we have states attempting to tax property of
corporations-as the state of New York in the case of the United
Verde Copper Company (People ex rel. United Verde Copper Co.
v. Feitner, 54 App. Div., 217),--not within their limits and there-
fore taxed elsewhere; and we have some states attacking domestic
and foreign corporations with laws tending to make it difficult to
associate capital for commercial operations too large for individuals.
individuals.
Pennsylvania.-As early as 1866 the state of Pennsylvania
granted a special charter to the "New York California Vineyard
Company," giving it power to do the business set out in its charter
"in any of the United States or territories thereof except in the state
of Pennsylvania the same as a natural person."
Subsequently, in i87o, the name of the company was by special
act changed to the "Land Grant Railway and Trust Company," and
it was given banking powers to be exercised "in any state, terri-
tory or country except the state of Pennsylvania."
The state of Kansas thrust out this corporation from its borders,
refusing to allow it to do business there.
The Supreme Court, 6th Kansas. 255, said:
"At the very creation of this supposed corporation its creators
spurned it from the land of its birth as illegitimate and unworthy
of a home among its kindred and sent it forthwith a wanderer on
foreign soil. Is the state of Kansas bound by any kind of courtesy
or comity or friendship, or kindness to Pennsylvania to treat this
corporation better than its creator (the state of Pennsylvania) is
bound ?"
"No rule of comity will allow one state to spawn corporations,
to send them forth into other states to be nurtured and do business
there when the state first among states will not allow lhem to do
business within its own boundaries."
New Jersey.-In the year 1897, New York introduced certain
legislation tending to make the stockholders and directors of foreign
corporations personally liable for the debts of the company in New
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York, provided, and if, the corporation failed to conform to certain
New York requirements.
New York attempted forcibly to domesticate foreign companies
-under penalty of practical withdrawel of the corporate shield of pro-
tection to stockholders and officers, imposing a contract liability on
stockholders and directors.
This was understood to be aimed specially at the numerous New
Jersey corporations doing business in New York.
As a counter move, a bill was drawn, passed by the New Jersey
legislature and signed by the Governor, all within forty-eight hours,
making it the law in New Jersey that such corporate liabilities cre-
ated by the statutes of other states were not enforcible in the State
of New Jersey.
The passage of this act was sufficient to end the usefulness of the
New York acts.
New York.-New York has its railroad and transportation laws
and forbids local railroads, telephone or telegraph companies to or-
ganize under any other act.
The state of New York refuses to give such organizations power
to do business in New York state unless they accept the conditions
and restrictions of the railroad and. transportation laws.
There is, however, now pending in the Legislature of New York
a bill providing that it shall be lawful to incorporate any company
under the Business Corporation Law "for the purpose of construct-
ing, maintaining and operating railroads, telephone or telegraph
lines" outside of this (New York) state.
The case of New York is cited because it is the latest among the
Eastern States to sell telephone, telegraph and railroad charters free
from the ordinary restrictions thrown about such corporations, pro-
vided their operations shall be removed and kept out of the state of
New York, and because this case is indicative of the tendency of the
times.
Connectict.-The state of Connecticut, too, is not far behind in
creating corporations to do outside of the state business which she
will not permit to be done within her borders.
Connecticut recently created by a special charter a banking com-
pany with power to hold its stockholders' meetings anywhere in the
world. In addition to banking powers the corporation was given
power to transact the business of merchants, manufacturers, miners,
commission merchants, agents of every kind, shippers, builders,
financiers, brokers, contractors and concessionaires," to construct
YALE LA WJOURNAL.
private or public works of any sort or kind, but "outside the state of
Connecticut;" to do a general transportation and railroad business
"outside the state of Connecticut;" to say nothing of power to act
as common carrier and as express forwarders, all outside of the state
of Connecticut.
As a limitation applicable to Connecticut and to no other state,
the charter provides that before a corporation shall conduct a bank-
ing and trust business in Connecticut, it shall obtain a li':ense
or permit to do such business in the state of Connecticut and,
to the extent that it does business in Connecticut, be subject to
the supervision of the banking commissioners. So far as Connecti-
cut was concerned or Connecticut citizens were involved, the welfare
of the state was carefully guarded by the provision that the broad
powers conferred upon the corporation of engaging in every kind
of enterprise were limited to operations outside of Connecticut.
"No publicity" was the rule of this company. The charter pro-
vides that-
"No stockholder shall have any right of inspecting the ac-
"counts or books or documents of the corporation, except as
"conferred by statute or authorized by the directors, or by a res-
"olution of the stockholders."
General Principles.-But to depart from specific cases.
Many states seem neither to look beyond their own borders nor
to legislate for the good of the country at large or the good of the
commercial movement of the times.
Few states in their corporate legislation seem to aim to assist the
United States as an entirety, in its struggle for the commercial su-
premacy of the world.
On the contrary, many states are willing to enrich their own
coffers at -the expense of the advancement of the nation.
The line of demarcation between the so-called charter-granting
states and the more conservative states is rapidly being eradicated;
the financial success of charter-granting states is tending to break
down the conservative legislation of many other states.
It is said that Massachusetts capital will not incorporate under the
laws of Massachusetts, and,-therefore, Massachusetts should amend
its corporation laws.
Is the vital question whether Massachusetts capital will incorpo-
rate under Massachusetts' laws or whether Massachusetts' laws are
right or wrong?
Is it a question of financial expediency or of principle?
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It needs no argument to enable the student of corporate legisla-
tion to come to the conclusion that the drift of state legislation is not
towards uniformity, but towards interstate warfare.
This contest between states has reached that point where the state
of Minnesota has openly charged the state of New Jersey with per-
mitting a great corporation to be organized for the express purpose
of doing the very things which are forbidden by the state law of
Minnesota, and directly affecting property located in Minnesota.
Interstate warfare has resulted in federal assumption of the mat-
ters in dispute where trade and commerce were unfavorably affected
and thereby there became involved the "Public Welfare."
Federal Assunzption.-In the very early days commerce was the
subject of a state war between New York and New Jersey.
New York imposed a duty on the farm and garden products of
New Jersey which came into New York. The boats of the New
Jersey men were seized, their cargoes of food confiscated, if they
attempted to escape the payment of this duty.
New York had put on a bit of sandy shore, now known as Sandy
Hook, a lighthouse for the guidance of commerce coming into New
York City.
New Jersey in retaliation taxed this at the rate of $I,8oo a year.
The Supreme Court of the United States ended the war.
New York granted to Robert Fulton and others the exclusive
right to operate vessels propelled by steam up and down the Hudson
River and into the waters of New York Bay.
Men from other states who attempted to navigate vessels by
steam from points in New Jersey to New York were enjoined by the
New York courts.
The United States Supreme Court freed trade and commerce
from state exactions and from interstate warfare by holding that
states had no jurisdiction over what is to-day called interstate com-
merce, and the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheaton, U. S. i)
is interesting reading from a retrospective standpoint. Many other
instances might be cited, but the principle is well recognized.
Demand for Better Corporation Legislation.-The advantages of
a National Corporation Act are seen not alone by the doctrinaires
of the schools of economics. The demand for better and higher cor-
poration laws has advanced beyond the realms of mere academic
discussion and has given rise to a practical demand in behalf of the
corporations. Giving all due credit for the inception of a demand for
higher corporate legislation to the student of economics, nevertheless
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the corporation man is not to-day slow to perceive the advantage of
better laws, national in origin, national in extent.
Corporations of Integrity Demand Better Laws.-But as I read
the trend of the times, there is a feeling which is taking shape as a
public demand on the part of the true industrials, on the part of
'hose organizations which desire that their securities shall be prop-
erly deemed and held as investments, that a different state of affairs
shall prevail with regard to corporate legislation.
And on the other hand, many great corporations are becoming
weary of the constant demands made upon them to meet and in vari-
Otis ways satisfy and avert the diverse and hostile "strike" legislation
of different states and territories.
The trend of matters among the corporations themselves is
upward.
This movement has its origin, in part, in the desire of the sound
corporation to draw a line of demarcation between itself and the cor-
poration otherwise situated.
The corporation whose capital is truly capital, whose finances will
stand publicity, and the character of whose officers recommends it
to the public, knows quite well that it can give an amount of pub-
licity, that it can make a public showing which corporations "other-
wise situated" do not dare to make.
The sound corporations recognize the homely principle that a
five-foot man will be drowned in crossing a stream through which a
six-foot man can go with safety.
Character.-But, more than this, the public are becoming so edu-
cated as to the value of character in vast organizations that there is
to-day a public demand for men of character as corporation leaders.
The public have compelled great corporations to recognize the
fact that they have no character apart from the character of the men
in control.
Wall Street is beginning to learn its lesson, and to find out that
securities will not be absorbed by the public if they are characterized
by the wrong class of leadership.
As one great organizer (and from the state of Massachusetts)
said in the organization of a recent company: "I know that to-day
this institution is sound, and I intend, by reason of the publicity
provisions in the charter of this company, that future investors shall
know whether the company is or is not sound; and I insist on the pub-
licity provision in the charter so that if stockholders at future annual.
meetings are not satisfied with the propriety and integrity of the
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management, they will have the right to do one of two things: either
change their management, or change their investments."
As illustrative of the growth of character in these organizations,
the speaker does not hesitate to refer (but without name) to one of
the so-called trusts, of which it is said that when the statement of the
corporation was presented to the board of directors before the annual
meeting, showing a marked increase in the value of the stock of the
company because, not only of its accumulations, but of its earnings,
an unrecorded resolution was passed to the effect (First) that this
information should not be given out by the board of directors to any
one outside until it should first have been delivered to the stockhold-
ers; and (Second) what is more worthy of commendation, that it
was the consensus of opinion that no director or officer of the com-
pany should avail himself of this advance knowledge to purchase
any of the stock of the company on the market, before the statement
was made to the public.
The demand for better administration, both practical and legal,
for character in the organization, for proper publicity, for proper
restrictions and control, whether proceeding from doctrinaires or mil-
lionaires, from the student of economics or from the individual in-
vestor in industrials, is but voicing the personal belief of many cor-
porate leaders of character and integrity, who know the situation
from a practical standpoint.
Facts are more important than theories. We turn, therefore,
with pleasure as proof of the above assertion to the recent report of
one of the large combinations, published and signed by the execu-
tive officer, which closed with this statement:
"The total number of stockholders of the company, immediately
after its organization, was about 1,3oo. The total number now is
5,153, of which i,86o are women. Trustees as we are for this large
and constantly increasing body of stockholders, many of them
women, some of them the widows and children of former associates,
all of them entitled to the best service we can give them, we must
and do feel that the administration of this great property is a trust
of the highest and most sacred character, and while it is in our charge
we shall ever strive to administer it in this spirit."
This growth along the lines of character is having its impress
upon organizations, and there is a marked tendency on the part of the
good to become better, and to distinguish themselves publicly from
the doubtful.
Publicity.-Public opinion demands publicity, and that demand
is being met by many corporations.
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We find charters of great organizations voluntarily prescribing
broad publicity and making it obligatory on the part of the man-
agement.
Publicity is of two kinds, public and private. "Private publicity"
means the giving of full information to each stockholder. This is
the first step. Public publicity means giving this information to the
public at large and that, too, whether the organization be a public
corporation, a quasi public corporation or a private company. As a
matter of fact, "private publicity" is simply presenting the thin edge
of the wedge, and "public publicity" is sure to follow in all cases
where the proposition is a matter of interest to the public. In the
case of a small corporation, with half a dozen stockholders, the infor-
mation may be confined to those stockholders, but the operation is
not likely to be large or to affect the public. On the other hand, if
there are many stockholders and its stocks and securities are held
as investments, many people will earnestly inquire about it, and by
means of the enforcement of "private publicity" many people will
find out the details, and therefore the country at large will know
them. Public publicity is the logical result of private publicity in all
cases where the public is interested. Publicity will give a clear
insight into the operation and workings of a trust and when this is
fully known the public will know how to deal with the proposition
as a whole.
No man can lay down any fixed rule for the organization and
maintenance of trusts generally, nor can one write of the genesis
of trusts as a species, because each is organized on a different basis,
by different men, with different purposes, and under different circum-
stances. The public assumes that in every trust there was first, the
promoter; second, the financier; third, the banking syndicate; and
finally, the public taking the securities or stocks.
What course has been followed in each instance by any one of the
trusts no man knows fully except the men who have charge of the
transactions, and these men, for professional or other reasons, de-
cline to make their knowledge public.
In regard to the method, too, by which the different properties
have been gathered into one aggregation, in almost every instance
a different method has been followed, and it has been the result of a
series of negotiations with a series of men.
As in the case of the financial development of the trust, so the
physical development has been, in almost every instance, a proceed-
ing peculiar to the proposition in charge.
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No general rule can be formulated, no statement can be made,
which would cover, with any degree of precision, the formation and
history, either physical or financial, of the great combinations.
This is one of the reasons why publicity is necessary in order
to deal with the trust problem, because, as a practical matter, there
are more people who think they know about the way trusts are organ-
ized, financed and managed than those who really do know.
The danger comes, therefore, both to the country and the com-
bination, that public opinion may be formulated and legislation
passed, based on the opinions of those who think they know about it,
while, in fact, they may be in important particulars mistaken.
This is one of the reasons, too, why industrial organizations are
the more willing to haVe publicity, but they insist that it shall be
enforced as against all if required of any.
This brings us again to the proposition that the regulation enforc-
ing publicity or enforcing any other limitation must be by a national
law and not by a state law, because if made by a state law it would
apply only to the particular corporation of or in that state.
Corporate Control and Regulation not Effective Under Present
System of State Legislation.-Every corporation man recognizes
the proposition that to-day there is practically-meaning actually-
no such thing as enforced publicity in its length and breadth through-
out the nation.
Neither are many other economic demands enforced under state
iegislation.
State legislation is more easily controlled than national. It can
be managed more quietly and more secretly.
Bills for the benefit of some particular corporation or corpora-
tions, are frequently cloaked under the disguise of a public measure.
They are amendments, so-called to existing laws, but they are
actually the thrusting of new, and ofttimes evasive matters into a
section of the statute in which they do not belong.
Such acts can be passed, they are passed, in state legislatures.
They are not noted by the public because they are not always
commented upon by the press.
An act passed in South Dakota affecting fundamental rights of
the stockholder of a great corporation, a law quietly enacted in
Delaware, in West Virginia, or in Maine, might not be the subject of
national discussion and national comment, and therefore, a national
public opinion might not have an opportunity to be heard before its
passage.
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The managing editor of a great "Daily" might not censure the
news department if a bill should be introduced, rushed through and
passed in the legislature of South Dakota or Delaware affecting a
corporation whose visible and tangible property was in Massachu-
setts; but should a "sneak act" affecting great corporate interests be
introduced at Washington, and on the very day of its introduction the
majority of the press throughout the United States not be apprised
of its introduction by their correspondents at Washington, there
would be trouble in the head offices.
A federal law would put all legislation, proper and improper, in
a glass case and expose it to the views of the entire public, so that
it is true not only that proper publicity may be obtained, but it may
be maintained by the national act and not otherwise.
Upon the introduction of any corporate law under a national,
system the representatives of every state would be heard upon the
subject, and the citizens of every state would be heard through their-
representative either in the National House of Representatives or in
the Senate.
Public opinion of every locality would be transmitted through
the representative of that locality and made an integral part, either
in the opposition or the promotion of the measure.
A National Incorporation Law would truly represent and be the
formulated public opinion of the nation.
The Utility of a National Law.-The question may be-asked
whether or not corporations would voluntarily avail themselves of
this national corporation law.
I answer this question unhesitatingly in the affirmative.
The national law should contain a provision along the lines of
that part of the National Banking Act which authorizes state bank-
ing institutions to become national banks, without great disturbance
internal or external.
Corporations now and hereafter organized would avail them-
selves of a national act,
First.-For reasons of self protection. It has been already stated
that it has become necessary for the sound corporations to differen-
tiate their position from those otherwise situated.
This is shown in the tendency to publicity on the part of organiza-
tions such as the United States Steel Corporation, the National Bis--
cuit Company and others equally entitled to mention.
It is quite necessary for sound corporations to create a public
distinction involving a recognized difference between themselves.
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and those which are following in their wake and attempting to imi-
tate their standing and position.
To-day mere capitalization means nothing.
Companies with an authorized capital of $5o,ooo,ooo in South
Dakota cost Eomewhat less than the charge of an average tailor for
an ordinary suit of clothes.
Second.-Financial interests will favor it.
No great corporation can be put upon the market without a finan-
cial syndicate. No matter how great or how strong is that syndi-
cate it must go to the banks for its money.
The banks will not perpetually advance to the syndicate funds
upon the underwritings or other securities. It is necessary for the
financial syndicate ultimately to get to the public to relieve the banks.
The bankers know this, and the banks, therefore, would insist,
before they would advance the funds, that the corporation should
be organized in such a manner as would insure at least the most con-
fidence on the part of the investing public.
The bankers would insist that the financiers organize their com-
pany under that law which would inspire the greatest public confi-
,dence in order that the. public would ultimately invest.
Should the promoters refuse to do this the result would be that
the banks would not advance money to the syndicate on its under-
writings, and the syndicate would fail to get its holdings taken by the
public, because the public would question the syndicate's action in
Tefusing to avail itself of a national law.
Third.-Corporations would avail themselves of this law as a
protection against the varied, diverse, and to-day inconsistent laws
of various states.
The tendency of the states is to attack foreign corporations, and,
therefore, a great corporation would avail itself of the privilege of
becoming a United States corporation. Such a corporation, being
foreign to no state, would secure to itself the privileges and immu-
-nities of a citizen in every state.
It would secure uniformity of legislation throughout the length
and breadth of the United States.
States may drive out insurance companies, but they cannot drive
national banks out, because the national bank derives its existence
from a power higher than that which confers a charter upon a state-
created organization.
Fourth.-No corporation engaged in interstate commerce, no
corporation desiring to do business throughout the length and
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breadth of the country, could afford to be other than a national
organization.
It would not be long before the investing public would draw the
lines sharply between state-created organizations assuming to do a
business national in extent and true national corporations.
The successful combination must be in its nature a national
organization in order even to pretend to carry out the economic
theories upon which it is based.
Given a law which creates real national corporations, and all
others would become imitators and be so known to the public.
The public would refuse to take the stock of such an organization on
the same principle on which it would refuse to take a counterfeit bill.
THE FORM OF A NATIONAL ACT.
It is with some hesitation therefore that I suggest as a basis of
discussion that a national act might contain some, if not all, of the
following elements among others:
First.-It should be optional with corporations, as in the case
of the National Banking Act, to organize under state acts if they
choose.
Second.-The law should prohibit the use of the name "national"
to ahy corporation but national corporations, compelling other cor-
porations which assume that title to relinquish it.
Third.-A national corporation should be protected from state
attack to the same extent to which national banks are protected, viz.,
it should not be subject to attachment or other provisional remedies
which prevail in some states against non-residents.
Fourth.-National corporations should be assured of the privi-
leges and immunities guaranteed to natural persons by the consti-
tution of the United States and discrimination against them by state
laws forbidden.
Fifth.-National corporations should have freedom from state
supervision and should be subject to taxation by the state only to
the amount of property actually in the state, and then upon the same
basis as an individual.
Sixth.-The national corporation should be subject to national
supervision and examination, and at least private publicity should be
compulsory, which would eventually result in a proper degree of
public publicity.
Seventh.-An annual report should be made by the corporation
to the federal authorities, showing the taxing situs of all its property.
Such information should be collated by some federal authority and
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furnished to the taxing officers of the various states in order that the
corporation might be justly and correctly taxed.
Eighth.-A national corporation should pay taxes upon all its
property locally where property is situated. Its stock in the hands
of stockholders might be exempted from taxation of every nature.
CONCLUSION.
In the organization and creation of our system of national
banks the way was paved for an extension of this system to other
corporations.
Neither the Constitution of the United States nor federal or
state statutes so distinguish between banks and other corpora-
tions that the analogy cannot be reasoned out. The constitutional
warrant for the national bank would seem to include a similar war-
rant for the industrial combination.
We have therefore before us an example of national corporations
in our national bank system.
It is fitting to close this discussion with the language of one
whose writings are entitled to profound respect. In his com-
mentary upon the works of Alexander Hamilton, Mr. Henry Cabot
Lodge said:
"The danger, inconvenience, and utter inefficiency of the state
banks are still freshly remembered. The country groaned and
chaffed under them for more than twenty years, until the Republican
party came into power and established the present system of national
banks. The new plan did away with the state banks by absorbing
them and thus destroying the active and interested opposition which
confronted the old Bank of the United States and its predecessor.
The present system seems to be firmly and permanently established.
It embodies Hamilton's two great principles-national banking,
supervised by the central government, and a national bank currency.
Hamilton's- policy of national banking has become an integral part
of our financial system, and has prevailed over all the attacks which
have been made upon it. There is another side, however, to the
question more important than its financial results. This is the con-
stitutional argument employed by Hamilton in his cabinet opinion
to which allusion has been made in a previous note. In this famous
cabinet opinion Hamilton summoned to his aid the doctrine of the
implied powers of the constitution, and the establishment of the bank
was the first triumph of that principle which has done more than
anything else to build up and strengthen the power of the national
government."
